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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOROTHY STEVENSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
VERNON L. STEVENSON, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 9529 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STA'TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an acti'on for divorce on the groun'd:s 
of mental cruelty. 
DISPOSTTION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court found that plaintiff failed 'to 
prove mental crueTty and den1ied her a divorce. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judg-
ment of the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'The parties to this action will be referred to 
as they appeared in the Tri'al Court. Since the State-
ment of Facts as presented in the Appellant's Brief, 
alludes to and presents that testimony which is 
most favorable to her position, and because the case; 
· is equi1taJble 'in nature and the Court has the power 
to review the evidence 'and weigh the s·ame, there 
follows a statement and discussion of pertinent 
testimony necessary to complete a review of the 
evidence 'in the case. 
Following a three day trial, the District Court 
denied plaintiff's prayer for relief in her suit 
against her husband for a divorce on lhe grounds 
of mental cruelty. 
The plaintiff ·and defendant became acquainted 
in 1934 while the defendant was completing his 
'internship as a medical doctor at the Sacred Heart 
·Hospital in Spokane, Washington. Shortly after, 
Dr. Stevenson began 'the practice of medicine in the 
small community of Garfield, approxim·ately 50 
miles from Spokane. Marriage followe'd in January 
of 19'35. (R. 25, 117). During the approximately 
four years in which the parties lived and worked 
in this small community, Dr. Stevenson described 
their relationsHip a·s follows: 
"I think to me this was a wonderful 
m·arri'age. I know how I felt, and I felt·dur-
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ing those years, and I am sure Mrs. Steven-
son felt they were wonderful years." ( R. 117) 
Both worked hard and in mutual understanding 
and confidence until sufficient money had been ob-
tained to make a down payment on a home in a 
larger city. They moved to 8'alt L'ake City in '1939 
('R. 118). The plaintiff alleges that their marriage 
was fraught with difficulties from the second night 
of their marriage. The defendant acknowledges that 
some small problems have arisen durlng their mar-
ried lives, prior to approxim'ately two years before 
the date of the tri~al, which he characterized 
as minor. Mrs. Stevenson alleged that Dr. Steven-
son has repeatedly suggested divorce during the 
course of their marriage. His answer to this charge 
,is conVincing. 
"I wouldn't be here in this courtroom 
:today if I had, (suggested divorce) and if 
I had 'any ide'a of obtaining a divorce, that 
is what I am figh'ting to preserve. No't only 
this marriage but this family." (R. 118) 
In her brief, the plain tiff makes reference to 
various "menial servi'Ces" which she alleges the de-
fendant required of her. She complains that she 
had the "responsibility" of cle'aning his pipe (Ap-
pellant's Brief, P. 3). However, her own testimony 
refutes the existence of any element of compulsion. 
She did it "because my father smoked a pipe and I 
knew how, and anything you know how to do, I 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guess you do it." (R. 36). She complained that she 
was "required to pack his sui tease" and make it 
ready for his use when· they left on trips. Certainly 
this is a matter of mutual effort and common co-
operation extended within a family for the purpose 
:of accommodating the busy schedule which the doc-
tor was maintaining. The spirit of cooperation is 
further demonstrated by the fact that Mrs. Steven-
son purchased the doctor's .clothes, which she liked 
to do ( R. 105 A) . !The long and la:te hours which 
the doctor was required to work ·to build and main-
tain his practice were frankly admitted by him as 
being a source of regret in his life. Even so, Mrs. 
Stevenson now charges as an element of mental 
cruelty that she screened telephone calls for the 
doctor late at night, although at the time such was 
her '''express desire" to give her husband an oppor-
tunity to rest after he had been working late. At 
the time she did not resent doing it (T. 1'48). The 
~defendant considered his rel~ationship with his wife 
a partnership in whlich both shared responsibility 
and mutually enjoyed the benefits (R. 150). 
During the war years, Dr. Stevenson served 
in the Navy. While he was in the Continental United 
States, prior to his leaving for service overseas, 
Mrs. Stevenson with their two children voluntarily 
accompanied him from one assignment to another 
(R. 120). During this time Dr. Stevenson recalled: 
'''I think we enjoyed the closeness during 
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t~ose first few months. It was the opportune 
time to get together and the hours at the Navy 
base didn't compare with private practice." (R. 119) 
While the family was in the service they had 
more time together and considered their inconveni-
ences a "family project" (R. 119-1'20). Following 
the war years Dr. Stevenson has taken his wife on 
an annual trip to Mexico, with fishing at Mazatlan 
and excursions to other parts of the Unites States, 
including Washington, D. C., Chieago, New Orleans, 
and the entire Northwest for the purpose of visiting 
Mrs. Stevenson's parents (T. 1'20). A close relation-
ship developed between 'the plain tiff's family 'and 
their own, which was encouraged and appreciated 
by the doctor ( R. 120) . 
The plaintiff suggests in her Brief (P. 4), that 
while she was suffering from !a hernia ted disc, 
proper medi:cal 'attention was not given to her. How-
ever, she admi'ts that she, with Dr. Stevenson, went 
to Omaha to consult Dr. Keeting, one of the best 
neurological surgeons in America, who did a com-
plete neurological survey of her condition ( R. 38, 
105). 
The plaintiff characterized her perform'ance 
of the common wifely duties in the home as a valet 
service ( R. 38) , and yet the record s'tands unre-
futed that until approximately two years before the 
trial the family was characterized by love and 'af-
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fection for each other (R. 123). Until then the 
family enjoyed happy and wonderful Christmases 
together. Just three years before, Mrs. Stevenson 
'bought a movie camera for the doctor and stated 
"we are going to give you 'a gift for once that is 
appropriate ( T. 12'3). 
'Plaintiff points to the fact that she maintained 
the swimming pool as an evidence of 'the mental 
cruelty which the defendant inflicted upon her (R. 
40). Dr. Stevenson explained that the construction 
of the pool was one of the first projects of the family. 
It was given to Mrs. Stevenson as 'a birthday gift 
-in 19'54 (R. 28-121). Plaintiff enjoyed swimming 
almost daily and was of '"championship caliber." 
She was not compelled to clean the pool as she now 
suggests, but supervised it out of interest and was 
happy in doing it ( R. 122). As the children grew 
up, they too enjoyed the pool wi'th their friends and 
the family (R. 122). 
The extent of family cooperation which char-
acterized the Stevenson home is demonstrated by 
the interest displayed by 'Mrs. Stevenson in assum-
ing the responsi:bility of preparing and filing the 
tax returns for the family. She also took care of 
the office records when other assistance was not 
available. Dr. Stevenson indicated: 
"This seemed to be 'a mutual effort until 
we could afford someone to do it for us. She 
came down to the office and 'did the work 
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when anyone was sick. She would fill in at 
any point." 
The doctor indica ted that in this respect she 
had done "a bang-up job for us" (R. 118). 
The plaintiff now complains about the neces-
sity of performing menial tasks around the home 
and yard, but the record is undisputed that after 
the family moved to Salt Lake City, a gardener 
and a cleaning woman were available to assist Mrs. 
Stevenson in m'ain taining the home. There were 
times when Mrs. Stevenson declined assistance (R. 
122). Further, the home was equippe'd wfth ~ade­
quate appliances to lighten the responsibility of 
maintaining the home and to preserve her time 
and health (R. 122). Even so, plaintiff suggests 
that failure to supply the most modern applitances 
is a form of mental cruelty. 
An issue was made of the fact that Mrs. Steven-
son brought lunch to her husband at his office be-
cause he was too busy to take a lunch hour, (Appel-
lan·fs Brief, P. 4) although she ~admits that such was 
'·'part of the routine of the house" (R. 44). It would 
seem unreasonable to find the extension of a com-
mon courtesy of this type between a husband and 
wife constituted mental cruelty. 
The plaintiff also begrudges having assisted 
her husband with legislation relative to the State 
Medical Council and complains that she missed a 
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bridge party because of it (R. 45). However, her 
interest in political matters was sufficient to man-
age Representative Dawson's political campaign at 
one time ( R. 105) . She is presently a National 
Committeewoman, and Dr. Stevenson has consis-
tently supported her in that endeavor, and he char-
acterized their mutual effort in this respect as a 
'''good team" (T. 125). 
~until approximately three years prior to the 
date o'f 'trial, the parties exhibited sufficient mutual 
confidence in each other to maintain checking and 
savings 'accounts. All purchases of stocks, bonds and 
insurance were in their joint names. They went fish-
ing, camping and boating together and enjoyed a 
happy and close family life ( R. t25). 
With reference to the ;change in attitude of 
Mrs. Stevenson, the doctor testified: 
"It was a change from a wonderful set-
up to a vexatious one, which changed and it 
was a sudden change, it was evident first to 
me three ye'ars ago, this month, on our trip 
to Mazatalan, Mexico. 'That was the first cog-
nizant feeling I had. 'There had been an abrupt 
change from a wonderful person, and anyone 
in this community knows that when we are 
out with friends." ( R. 126) 
'It is not surprising that Dr. Stevenson searched 
diligently to find the source of the difficulty which 
was breaking his married life and home. He in-
dica ted that suddenly he met open antagonism from 
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his wife, and that communication between them 
broke down (R. 127-129). She no longer wished to 
go out with the doctor to the hospital at his invita-
tion, while he Was making his rounds. She didn't 
want to do 'anything they ordinarily had done. 'Their 
friends and association with the various clubs to 
which they belonged suffered because of a lack of 
it (T. 1'27). Dr. Stevenson observed that she was 
:losing weight and suggested they consult a doctor 
concerning it. She didn't accept the suggestion kind-
ly, hut retorted: 
"I need no medical care, I won't receive 
any." (T. 128). 
The doctor indicated that for the first time in 
her life she became ''aggressive". 
The doctor was convinced that his wife ·could 
be assisted medically and he made every effort to 
make medical care available to her ( T. 115) . 
He was convinced that divorce was not an an-
swer to the problem (T. 1'20, 141). 
Plaintiff notified the doctor of her intention 
to leave him by leaving a note under his pollow, 
which he discovered after returning from taking 
her to the train. She was going to visit their daugh-
ter who was attending school in California. It simply 
stated, "I don't love you, I have left ... " (T. 1'28). 
The love and concern the doctor had for his 
wife is demonstrated most convincingly by his con-
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duct. As soon as he found the note from his wife 
jndicating that she was le'aving their home, he and 
their son drove through the night to Los Angeles 
to discuss the matter with Mrs. Stevenson and to 
find a solution to their problem. In an attempt to 
reconcile their differences, Dr. Stevenson expressed 
his desire to make concessions and to conform to 
more of her desires (T. 147). He tried to be more 
attentive and on repeated occasions pled with her: 
"Let's do something, let's get some help, 
see what we can do for this partnership 'and 
this family" (T. 150) . 
In an attempt to relieve her burdens in the 
household, he and the children gathered the dishes 
and he answered every telephone call at night. Even 
so, Mrs. Stevenson moved her sleeping quarters into 
another room, which further aggravated the situa-
tion. 
The plaintiff 'attempts to impute mental cruelty 
from the defendant's suggestions that she consult 
psychiatrists for a "mental problem". His concern 
was for her well being and that of their home and 
family. The doctor considered the problem with his 
wife was primarily an "emotion'al" one (T. 151). 
'The doctor testified that in his opinion he had 
been at fault in the marriage in devoting too much 
time to the profession and there was a lack of 
'''emotional communication" (R. 153). As indicated 
10 
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in Exhibit P-1, the defendant wrote a note to his 
wife wherein he stated, "I asked God's forgiveness 
for not being a good husband." Plaintiff points to 
this as indication that Dr. Stevenson was responsible 
for the marital breakup. However, on cross-eX'amin-
ation when asked what he meant by these words, 
Dr. Stevenson stated: 
"It means a lot - at that time it is an 
emotional impact that is characteristic of an 
individual . . . * * * I meant tha;t at the 
time this was a breakup of love and a family, 
I was sorry for it. That was the intent, I was 
sorry for it." (R. 155) 
Certainly this indicates the willingness of the 
doctor to meet the situation more than half way in 
·an attempt to find a solution to the problem which 
is plaguing his home. 1This attitude is consistent 
with reconciliation as opposed to the attitude of 
his wife as demonstrated in the following colloquy 
between the wife and counsel on cross-examination. 
Question : ~ 41The whole fault was on the part 
of your husband? 
Answer: I think so, I have tried to be a good 
wife." (R. 239, 167) 
The Stevenson family before this marital 'dif-
ficulty arose lived in much the same manner as 
any other family of a successful professional man. 
They enjoyed a swimming pool together ('R. 121, 
122), went on trips to Mexico and visited the plain .. 
11 
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tiff's parents in the State of Washington with whom 
the defendant and the children had a fine relation-
ship. They worked together in politics (R. 125), 
and as a team in his profession ( R. 118). The de-
fendant testified that the first evidence of plaintiff's 
change of attitude toward him occurred three years 
before the trial on March 1, 1961, while the parties 
were on a trip to Mazatlan, Mexico (R. 126-148, 
149). Because of this sudden change in their rela-
tionship after twenty-five years of happy married 
life, the defendant felt the difficulty stemmed from 
the fact that plaintiff was suffering from an emo-
tional problem caused 'by the onset of the menopause 
or ''·change of life", in the words of laymen, which 
had been aggravated by his failure to recognize the 
situation earlier and devote more time to her and 
less to his practice (R. 129 and 130). (She was 
forty -seven years of age.) He urged that both of 
them seek help (R. 129). The plaintiff saw Dr. 
Hardin Branch once for an examination to deter-
mine if she was paranoid ( R. 34). The defendant 
·saw him once for fifteen minutes (R. 130). Sub-
sequently in compliance with a promise made to her 
son, Vernon Jr. she consulted with Dr. William 
Brown, a psychologist engaged in marriage coun-
seling, for ·a total of 24 hours. The defendant also 
counseled with Dr. Brown for a total of 14 hours 
'(R. 130). Dr. Brown informed the defendant that 
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in counseling with the plaintiff he said, "I have 
met a point of resistance; I cannot break this bar-
rier. It is a deeper barrier than superficial and a 
barrier I cannot break" ( R. 131), that he had sug-
gested hypnosis but the plaintiff would not consent 
(R. 131). The defendant felt the plaintiff shoul'd 
continue with the counseling and in a conference 
with Dr. Brown it was agreed that an attempt 
would be made to persuade the plaintiff to continue 
with the counseling by enlisting the help of their 
daughter, M'arjorie (R. 133). At the trial, Dr. 
'Brown, testifying on behalf of the plaintiff, denied 
the need for further counseling but admitted on 
cross-examination that he may have used the word 
"barrier" in conversation with the defendant, and 
he had suggested hypnosis, which plaintiff refused. 
(R. 89 and 90). 
Plaintiff was later referred by Dr. Hardin 
Branch to Dr. Ijan Korner for a psychological evalu-
ation. Dr. Korner's report on the results of the tests 
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-7. He saw 
the plaintiff three times. On the last two appoint-
ments she was given some psychological tests (R. 
169). He concluded that she was not mentally ill 
and that she was not an individual who at the time 
he tested her should be considered in the common 
sense of the word "neurotic". But he note'd that 
she had an unwillingness to communicate about her 
13 
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own feelings which appeared to be of long stand-
ing, that she was a person who had been for a long, 
long time unable to talk to others about her feelings 
or thoughts, that she did not permit even herself 
to know what she felt, that she was terrorized by 
the imagined power of her husband and agonized 
by her decision to oppose his powers, that there was 
some evidence that this situation resembled earlier 
pre-adolescent experiences in her life. She was quite 
frightened. She was in terror of the situation which 
was related to her extreme hostilities which were 
unexpressed an'd well repressed. She was afraid of 
her hostility and in her fantasies suffered all of 
the discomforts of retaliation (P. 7). Dr. Korner 
admitted there is a gray area 'between normalcy 
and a:bnormalcy ( R. 172) , that most people during 
their lives cross into the gray area and return. As 
stated in his report (P. 7) he testified on cross-
examination that her feelings had been repressed 
for a long period of time · ( R. 182) . In answer to a 
question from the Court he said the adverse reaction 
of plaintiff toward defendant because of her re-
pression could have been building up for years with-
out defendant's being aware of what was happen-
ing ( R. 191) . In accordance with an order of the 
court both parties obtained 12 hours of consultation 
immediately before the trial. Defendant saw Dr. 
James Simmons, staff psychiatrist at the N euro-
14 
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psychiatric Institute located at the University of 
California Medical Center in Los Angeles. His re-
port was introduced into evidence as Exhibit D-4. 
The plaintiff saw Dr. Craig Nelson, a psychiatrist 
practicing in 'Salt Lake City. 'His report is in tro-
duce dinto evidence as Exhibit P-3. On cross-exam-
inati'on Dr. Nelson said there were neurotic factors 
which played a part in the pl:aintiff's decision to 
terminate the marriage (R. 2'12), but contended 
that despite these "neurologic :factors" her de'cision 
was rational. In answer to questions from the Court 
Dr. Nelson said it was possible that the plaintiff 
could have unreasonable fears about the defendant's 
authority and yet be classed 'as a healthy person. 
Unreasonable fears were defined as not being found-
ed on reality. This could be attributed to a childhood 
condition; further, that the defen'dant could live 
with the plaintiff for years without knowing that 
the problem was developing. (R. 213, 214). 
ST ATEMEN'T OF POTN'TS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S FINDING OF FACT NO. 4, IS SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS NOT CON-
TRARY TO THE WEIGHT THEREOF. 
'POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IS SUPPORTE'D 
BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS NOT CONTRARY TO 
THE WEIGHT THEREOF, NOR IS IT AGAlNST TH'E 
LAW. 
15 
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ARGUMENT 
The alleged error of the trial court i's set out 
in two separate points by the appellant, and are 
argued as one. Similarly, respondent will answer 
the arguments of the appellant in the same manner. 
While it is true that the Supreme Court in equity 
cases may review and weigh the evidence, the exer-
cise of this power is not without limitation. In the 
case of Doe vs. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781 ; the 
scope of review by the Supreme Court was defined 
a:s follows: 
''While we, on appeal, may approve, modi-
fy, or annul, them (findings) yet when speci-
fie Findings are made on material issues, re-
specting which the evidence is in conflict, we, 
because of the trial court's better opportunity 
to test the credibility of witnesses and the 
weight of their testimony, generally approve 
such findings ; unle'Ss on the record it is shown, 
and we are persuaded, that the finding is so 
. clearly against the weight of evidence as to 
show error.'' 
In the 1956 case of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 
2d. 79, 296 P.2d 977, the trial court granted the 
plaintiff a divorce but awarded substantially all 
of the property of the parties to the defendant. On 
appeal by the defendant the court again acknowl-
edged its right to review and weigh the evidence of 
the case, but set out the re'Striction of this authority 
as follows: 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The more recent pronouncements of this 
Court and the policies to which we adhere, 
are to the effect that the trial judge has con-
siderable latitude of discretion in such mat-
ters, and his judgment should not be changed 
lightly, and in fact, not at all, unless it worked 
such a manife'St unjustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion." 
The same principle was announced in slightly 
different language in the case of McDonald v. Mc-
Donald, 236 P.2d 1066, 120 !Utah 573: 
''We adhere to the qualifications set forth 
in the more recent expressions of this court: 
That the judgment will not be distributed un-
less the evidence clearly prepon'dera tes against 
the findings of the trial :court; where there has 
been a plain abuse of discretion or where a 
manifest injustice or inequity is wrought." 
See 'also, Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 
138 P.2d 252; Allen v. Allen 109 Utah 99, 165 P.2d 
872, Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 3'21 P.2d 
931, to the same effect. 
'The appellant devotes ·22 pages of his brief to 
a review of the facts of the case in an attempt to 
show that over the period of twenty-seven ye'ars, 
during which the parties have been married, that 
acts of unkindness have occurred for which the de-
fendant is deemed responsible. So meticulous was 
the plaintiff in her review of these difficulties that 
she rehearses in detail for the public record ·some 
minor incidents, one of which she alleges occurred 
17 
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the second night of their marriage in 1935. With 
calculated care she rehearsed the problems which 
arose during their wedded life and which for at 
least 24 years the parties had overlooked and main-
tained a home of stability in the community and 
raised a family to 'adulthood. Many of the events 
which were testified to by the plaintiff were not 
remembered by the defendant. Not out of crassness 
nor non-concern for the feelings of the plaintiff 
nor "distainfully" as suggested in her brief at page 
12, but because these matters were inconsequental 
when viewed in the setting of a married life which 
spanned a period of twenty-seven years. Under 
examination by the Court the plaintiff testified 
that she didn't have any faults which brought on 
the divorce ( R. 167). The trial court was not willing 
to believe that all the difficulties which arose during 
their long marriage were chargeable to the defen-
dant. As suggested in the cases cited above, the trial 
court had the advantage of observing the demeanor 
of the witnesses and weighing the testimony. Mter 
so observing them and listening to the testimony 
of all witnesses the trial court was convinced that 
a ground of divorce based on mental cruelty, did 
not exist. There is nothing in the record which in-
dicates that this judgment was a ~'plain abuse of 
discretion", or that ''''a manifest injustice or in-
equity" was wrought by reason of the court's de-
cision. 
18 
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Considerable space in appellant's brief is de-
voted to a review of textual material on the subject 
of Marriage and Divorce, (pages 24-27 inclusive) 
wherein the writer discusses the proposition that 
physical 'brutality is not neces·sary to establish 
grounds for divorce on the ground of mental ·cruelty. 
Certainly, authority beyond the expressions of our 
own ~ourt need not be consulted to establish this. 
As a matter of fact, the legislature has specified 
mental cruelty as 'a ground for divorce. Although 
the term is somewhat uncertain in meaning our 
courts have given it sufficient interpretation to 
permit equitable application. In the case of Curry 
v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 321 P.2d 939, the court 
observed that: 
"There, of course, must be some objective 
standards upon which to judge whether men-
tal cruelty is made out. But it must also be 
realized that what constitutes cruelty to the 
extent of causing great mental distress has 
considerable subjective content because it de-
pends somewhat upon the sensabilities of the 
person complaining, and also in a measure 
upon the justification, or lack of it, for the 
conduct complained of." 
In this connection the wisdom of the previous 
expre'Ssions of this court concerning the "discretion" 
vested in the trial court is plainly manifest. Whether 
or not the alleged act of the defendant constitutes 
mental cruelty must be, to a great extent, subjective-
ly applied to the case under consideration. ·The trial 
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judge has an opportunity to observe the "sensibili-
ties of the person complaining" and to measure the 
justification or lack of it for the conduct of which 
complaint is made, 'and upon this basis to determine 
whether or not the elements of mental cruelty exist. 
In the instant case it is difficult to conceive how 
acts which occurred 27 years before, many of which 
were denied or not remembered by the defendant, 
can now realistically constitute a basis of creating 
great mental distress in the plaintiff. The grava-
men of the plaintiff's testimony was to rehearse 
for the benefit of the court, in an attempt to justify 
the complaint which had been filed, all of the diffi-
culties the parties had experienced in 27 years of 
wedded life and for which the plaintiff in an am·az-
ing display of self-righteousness attempts to lay 
the entire responsibility at the feet of the defendant. 
This case ha'S many similar aspects to that of 
Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. '235 (1926). 
There the plaintiff husband after having been mar-
ried for 45 years brought suit for divorce against 
his wife upon grounds of mental cruelty. He com-
plained particularly that during the past five years 
his wife had been of a "mean and cross disposition", 
had persistently and habitually abused him by call-
ing him vile and insulting names, had been of sullen 
and cross disposition, had failed to give him recog-
nition except to sneer at him, had manifested the 
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greatest hatred toward him, told him repeatedly 
that she despised him and that her life with him 
had been nothing but hell, and that she would not 
be sorry when she was done with him. As a conse-
quence of defendant's hatred and treatment, the 
plaintiff husband was compelled to leave home and 
ever since his leaving had lived separate and apart 
from her. He alleged that her hatred toward him 
was so great that it was impossible for him to live 
with her and that her conduct and treatment of him 
had caused, great mental distress and suffering. 
·The defendant generally denied the plaintiff's 
allegations and counterclaims alleging adultery and 
cruel treatment against her husband, upon which 
grounds she prayed for divorce. The only issue pre-
sented on appeal was whether there was sufficient 
grounds for divorce on the part of either party. After 
enumerating the considerable problems of the parties 
over the years, which included many cruel remarks 
directed at each other, the court denied relief to 
either party. 
"Upon the whole record, we think there 
is no substantial reason shown why the par-
ties should be divorced from each other. It is 
not enough that they both desire a divorce or 
refuse to live with each other. Courts are not 
authorized to grant divorces except on the 
particular causes prescribed by law, and they 
only when the grounds or cause for divorce is 
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proved by substantial and satisfactory evt-
dence." (Emphasis added). 
Language in appellant's brief is quoted from 
the cases of Hendricks v. Hendricks, 12'3 Utah 178, 
257 P."2d 366, Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 
P.2d 9'77, and from Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 
2d 187, 3'21 ·P.2d 93'1, in support of a suggested 
proposition that in these situations where the mar-
riage relationship has deteriorated to a point where 
its continuance appears hopeless, that it is the re-
sponsibility of the court to grant a divorce and 
terminate the legal relationship of husband and 
wife. However, a review of those cases and subse-
quent pronouncements of the Supreme Court clearly 
indicates that such is not the law in Utah, and the 
cases cited do not support it. 
In the Hendricks case the plaintiff sued and 
the defendant counterclaimed for divorce. From a 
judgment dismissing the action the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The court found that each party was guilty 
of cruel treatment of the other and that grounds 
existed but refused to grant a divorce to either, be-
cause each were considered to be equally at fault. 
The parties were advanced in years having raised 
a family and it was contended that the parties 
would be happier if they were free to go their sep-
arate ways. 
This Court recognized that it is seldom, per-
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haps never, that a wholly innocent party seeks a 
divorce against one who is wholly guilty. Upon this 
basis the Court stated: 
'·'Our policy has been to take into consid-
eration the practical exigencies of such situ-
ations, and in cases such as the instant one, 
where both are at fiault, approved the granting 
of divorce to the one least to blame." 
It should be specifically noted that both parties 
had been guilty of cruel treatment of the other and 
either of them would have been entitled to a divorce 
under different cir~cumstances. However, in the in-
stant case, the trial ·court specifically found that the 
plain tiff had not proved to its sa tis'faction that the 
defendant has been guilty of cruel treatment. Fur-
ther, the defendant is resisting and not seeking a 
divorce. The Hendricks case is not precedent for the 
granting of divorce in the instant case. 
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah ·2d 79, 296 iP.'2d 
97'7, the question of sufficiency of proof regarding 
the grounds for divorce was not raised. The only 
question that was considered wa:s the reasonableness 
of the property settlement which the court made. 
It is difficult to see how that case under any cir-
cumstances can be authority for the relief here 
sought by this appellant. 
In any event, the Supreme Court in the case of 
Curry v. Curry, 7 Utah 2d 198, 3'21 P.2d 939, cor-
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rected any misunderstanding in this regard which 
may have resulted from the earlier cases. 
In the Curry case the plaintiff wife sued for 
divorce which was met by 'a counterclaim of the 
husband. The trial court awarded the husband a di-
vorce on his counterclaim. It is to be noted that both 
were seeking a divorce. 
The Court recognized that the Wilson and Hen-
d ricks cases contained language to the effect that 
public policy is best served in granting 'a divorce 
"when it appears that the purposes of matrimony 
had been destroyed to the extent that further living 
together was intolerable, it was in accordance with 
the ·court's duly and perogative to grant the plain-
tiff a divorce." Any comfort appellant may have 
found in this language is quickly dispelled in the 
following quotation from the Curry opinion: 
"The gravaman of defendant's attack on 
the judgment is that the trial judge ... mis-
understood and misapplied the law in that he 
thought that because the parties could not 
get along, he ought to grant a divorce whether 
the plain tiff had made out grounds or not. 
It is true that Judge Wahlquist stated that 
under 'the cases of Hendricks v. Hendricks 
and Wilson v. Wilson, he thought he should 
grant a divorce, but in both of those cases 
there existed grounds for divorce, as is plain-
ly indicated in the respective opinions, and 
they cannot properly be tortured into holding 
that a divorce should be granted where spouses 
are unable to live harmoniously together, 
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wh_ether grounds sufficient to meet the re-
qu~rements of our statute are made out or not. 
We do not think that the record supports de-
fendant's contention tha:t the trial court so 
misunderstood or applied the law. That on the 
contrary, supports pl'aintiff's thesis that he 
applied the rule which we recognize as cor-
rect: that there must exist grounds for di-
vorce sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of our statute, which specify cruelty to the 
extent of causing great mental distress." 
While it is true, as recognized in the Curry 
case, that the Court cannot remand the parties 
"back into a state of reconciHation and happiness", 
the language is clearly not susceptible to the mean-
ing implied by the plaintiff to the effeet that a 
divorce should be granted to alleviate an unhappy 
situation where grounds of divorce do not exist. 
Again the Court emphasized the principle of ~aw 
by which the courts of Utah are to be guided in 
divorce rna tters : 
''The precept is well established that 
the trial court is vested with broad equitable 
powers in divorce matters and that its judg-
ment will not be disturbed lightly, nor ~at all, 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against his findings, or there has been a plain 
abuse of discretion, where a manifeset in-
justice or inequity is wrought." 
In summary, the medical testimony of Dr. 
Brown showed that his counseling was inconclusive. 
The plaintiff saw him under compulsion, fulfilling 
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a promise to her son and refused to continue with 
further consultations. According to the defendant's 
testimony Dr. Brown informed him that he never 
did get to the basic problem that was troubling the 
plaintiff. Granted that most people involved in mar-
ital difficulties would be subject to emotional dis-
turbance and tension; however, we submit that Dr. 
Korner's testimony supports the defendant's con-
tention that plaintiff's trouble resulted from emo-
tional factors pre-dating her decision to obtain a 
divorce. Her antagonism towards the defendant de-
veloped from imagined grievances, most of which 
had their origin in innocuous things the defendant 
did as part of everyday living which she interpreted 
or characterized as affronts to her. For example, 
in caring for the swimming pool and tleaning the 
large house without help she exhibited a martyr 
complex, that in her mind the defendant was re-
sponsible for these things which she did when in 
fact had the matter been called to his attention he 
would have been only too glad to see to it that she 
had whatever household help she needed. One of 
the common characteristics of people who ~are men-
tally disturbed is the development of a persecution 
complex with a certain amount of satisfaction out 
of the role of a martyr while at the same time com-
plaining bitterly and blaming others, frequently 
those who are nearest and dearest for what becomes 
26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subjectively a real problem even though imagined. 
This conclusion is also supported by the testimony 
of Dr. Nelson who said in essence that the neurotic 
elements which at one time played a part in the 
plaintiff's decision to terminate the miarriage were 
reasonably modified by counseling from Dr. William 
Brown and psychotherapy by him. It is significant 
that he was not aware that Dr. Brown had sug-
gested hypnosis in attempt to penetrate the '''barrier" 
which plaintiff lrad raised 'against further discus-
sion of her problem. 
Because the plaintiff now seeks divorce, is the 
defendant required to accede to her desire, when 
from his point of view until three years ago the 
marriage was ideal? Granted, there were the usual 
problems that plague every successful professional 
practioner dedicating a disproportionate amount of 
time to his practice. In this instance the defendant 
has had a broader perspective than most, for his 
family has taken many trips and enjoyed other 
numerous activities together. 'They were a close 
family unit and they had 'a wonderful relationship. 
Certainly he has not been penurious in providing 
them with the comforts of life. The parties until 
this marital difficulty arose worked as a partner-
ship. All of his property, real and personal, is in 
their joint names. Since their separation he has 
voluntarily made funds available to satisfy her needs 
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and furnished additional funds for trips she has 
made in connection with her political activities. He 
is fighting to maintain the unity of his family, and 
who is to say that when this matter is withdrawn 
from the trauma resulting from this litigation, that 
the parties will not eventually reconcile their dif-
ferences, as he fervently hopes. If he is earnest in 
his opinion that the root of the trouble is an emo-
tional change iadversely affecting the plaintiff which 
will resolve itself with the passing of time, certainly 
in contesting this divorce action he is doing no more 
than should 'be expected of any devoted husband. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
did not abuse his discretion in denying a divorce 
to appellant. The evidence clearly supports the trial 
court's finding that plaintiff failed to prove that 
defendant was guilty of cruelty causing great men-
tal distress. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAN'S'ON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
By--------------------------------------------------------
Attorneys for Respondents 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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